The Nuclear Deal: It’s about More than Nuclear Trade

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Washington, DC – There are lots of opinions on whether the package of announcements during President Obama’s visit to India in January constitutes a real step forward in our bilateral relationship. In particular, lacking key details, there are questions over whether the workaround for civilian nuclear trade is the breakthrough both sides claim.

But this argument misses the broader point. Nuclear trade would be important, but it is even more important for the US government to know it is dealing with a government in Delhi that is both strategic in its global outlook and willing to fulfill its commitments. Measured by these two variables, the visit was quite remarkable.

The importance of civilian nuclear trade is not in question. India is energy starved, and a heavier reliance on nuclear power could reduce the nation’s trade deficit while reducing emissions. From the US perspective, nuclear power exports will also help offset our trade imbalance with India, which is roughly two-to-one in India’s favor.

In recent years, the US strategic community was far more concerned over the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s inability to use its often underestimated political muscle to pass a clean nuclear liability law than about the ensuing lack of nuclear power exports. This was understandably used as proof that India’s commitment to deepening our strategic partnership was not as profound as the United States had originally hoped. This disappointment served to erode interest in engaging on other fronts.

The fact that India made real efforts to find a workaround solution to enable nuclear trade gives fresh confidence that we can make progress on other fronts. Similarly, the announcement that we will finally move forward with four co-development projects under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) further underscores the Modi government’s willingness to fast-track projects that could not move earlier.

Paired with the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (JSV), our strategic relations have moved beyond unlocking strategic trade. Our governments have publicly outlined the reasons for deepening our strategic partnership. Until this visit, the leaders had not been very willing to commit to paper a coherent vision of where this partnership might lead.

Yes, there is more work to be done. But our governments have undoubtedly made more progress in cementing a deeper partnership in the last eight months than they had made in the previous six years. The next two years are obviously critical.

The governments will have to get the DTTI projects off the ground and develop the “roadmap” mentioned in the JSV in order to make sure the next US president understands that the relationship with India is worth a personal investment. Such a determination is not necessarily automatic.

But as we have seen in the last five months, this relationship needs resolute commitment from its leaders to break logjams when they happen and also to deploy strong lieutenants to handle this account. Both the United States and India will constantly find themselves pulled toward the crises of the day. But taking the time to invest in a stronger partnership will also reinforce our shared efforts to combat such crises when they arise.

While specific details on the civilian nuclear trade “breakthrough” and other announcements from the trip are pending, these agreements carry importance beyond their specific meaning. The concerns held by the US side that India may not be interested, willing, or able to carry through on specific commitments that would underpin our deepening partnership have been alleviated—a point that carries deep significance on its own.

Richard Rossow
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Richard Rossow is a senior fellow and holds the Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies at CSIS.

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