17 December 2024
Mr. President,
- It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms Kaja Kallas, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA).
- I would also like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 as well as Malta as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231. We take note of the 18th report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2231.
- Ensuring that Iran does not acquire or develop a nuclear weapon is a key security priority for the EU. Today, more than ever, Iran’s nuclear programme cannot be seen in isolation from regional developments. We still believe that diplomacy is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and that a fully functioning nuclear deal will be conducive to the stabilization of the whole region.
- UNSCR 2231, which endorses the JCPOA, still provides the reference framework for the assessment and regular reporting by the IAEA. In this framework, the IAEA remains the sole impartial and independent international organisation to monitor and verify the implementation of Iran’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments. We commend DG Grossi for his continuous efforts to restore an adequate cooperation with Iranian authorities as demonstrated during his trip to Tehran last November.
- We are alarmed by Iran’s nuclear trajectory, which is constantly expanding, as confirmed by IAEA reports. Iran continues to depart from its JCPOA commitments and irreversibly gaining knowledge. Iran’s accumulation of high-enriched uranium and the expansion of its nuclear enrichment infrastructure are particularly grave.
- Moreover, Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA is affecting the IAEA’s ability to carry out its monitoring duties. It impedes the agency from providing assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. As a result of not having been able to perform JCPOA-related monitoring activities for more than three and a half years, the IAEA has lost the continuity of knowledge on several key components of the nuclear programme of Iran. This makes the definition of a baseline, a key component for the resumption of diplomatic efforts, even more challenging.
- The reporting by IAEA DG Grossi at the end of November on the further expansion of enrichment capacity and operation, as well as in early December on a sharp increase in the production of 60% enriched uranium, close to military levels, are extremely concerning. Iran was already far away from its JCPOA commitments. With these moves, Iran chose to make another escalatory step.
- Such actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions. In this context, the comments made on various occasions by Iranian officials suggesting that Iran’s nuclear doctrine could change are of great concern.
- We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions. The US have also imposed additional sanctions linked to the nuclear programme. At the same time, Iran’s nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever.
- Regarding other aspects of JCPOA implementation, we note that the Procurement Channel remains ready to receive proposals. It was designed as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to give assurances that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.
Mr. President,
- We are also extremely worried about Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones, which was done in violation of the provisions of UNSCR 2231. In view of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, the EU adopted new and significant restrictive measures. These measures, unanimously adopted by the EU 27, include entities involved in shipping Iran’s military equipment. They were taken under the EU framework in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. They are not linked to the implementation of the JCPOA. We call on the Government of Iran to stop military support to a country that is violating the UN Charter. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary.
Mr. President,
- The 6 months since our last session on UNSC 2231 have seen the situation worsen on many aspects including the nuclear trajectory and beyond. The next few months will be uncertain and risky. Nobody would be served by increasing escalation, which could easily spiral out of control.
- With this in mind, we call on all remaining parties to the JCPOA and the United States to sustain dialogue on the Iranian nuclear programme and related sanctions matters.
- At the same time, we urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA, and to refrain from further moving away from its JCPOA commitments as a first confidence building measure. De-escalation steps on the nuclear front would help restore trust. They could re-create an environment conducive to the resumption of negotiations.
- The Iranian nuclear issue can only be addressed in a sustainable manner with the adequate involvement of the international community.
- The EU High Representative, in her role of Coordinator, is committed to contribute to the development of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme in order to preserve the space for nuclear diplomacy. Iran has to deliver on its side.
Thank you, Mr. President.