4 March 2024
Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Security Council,
I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief you once again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am conducting this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from the office.
Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118.
Mr. President,
Since the Council’s previous meeting on this matter, the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (or DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic.
As was reported at the last briefing of the Council on this matter, consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority resumed in October 2023, after a gap of more than two and a half years. I am pleased to further report that another round of consultations have taken place from 23 January to 1 February 2024, which is the twenty-sixth round of consultations.
I have been informed that during the twenty-sixth round of consultations, the DAT conducted technical meetings, revisited the status of outstanding issues, discussed ways to resolve these issues, and interviewed seven persons who were involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The DAT also discussed the results of analysis of samples it collected between 2019 and 2023, with a focus on the unexpected presence of indicators of potentially undeclared activities involving research and development, production, storage, and/or the weaponization of unknown quantities of chemical weapons. Throughout the technical meetings, the DAT requested and explained to the Syrian National Authority the need for tangible, scientifically plausible, and verifiable explanations, amendments, and documents to resolve issues.
I have been informed that the Syrian National Authority provided several amendments and explanations regarding research activities at some sites, taking into consideration the DAT’s proposals and requests. In addition, following the consultations, on 15 February 2024, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted two Note Verbales regarding three outstanding issues and new explanations of the results of the analysis of samples collected by the DAT at one of the declared sites. I have been informed that the DAT is currently analysing the information received and will report the results in due course.
I encourage all parties involved to continue this renewed spirit of cooperation, so that all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic can be resolved.
Mr. President,
These outstanding issues includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (or SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons.
With regard to inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is planning the next round of inspections in 2024. However, as of the dates of this month’s report, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018. In addition, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has advised that it will continue its engagement with the Syrian National Authority concerning the origin and usage of a chemical of dual-use nature observed by the inspection team during the previous round of inspections in September 2022.
The OPCW Technical Secretariat has also requested information regarding the unauthorised movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility. I have been informed that, as of the date of this report, the Technical Secretariat has not received a response to this request.
Mr. President,
The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Convention, decisions by OPCW policymaking organs, and Security Council resolutions.
However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to continue its cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and respond with urgency to all of the Technical Secretariat’s requests.
Mr. President,
Since the last meeting of the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) have both released reports under their respective mandates.
On 22 February 2024, the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a report of the Fact-Finding Mission regarding an incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in al-Yarmouk on 22 October 2017. The report concluded that the information obtained and analysed in line with the FFM’s mandate was not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the FFM to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incident. The FFM is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Executive Council on the results of its work in due course.
The OPCW Technical Secretariat also issued a report on 22 February 2024, entitled Fourth Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use”, Marea (Syrian Arab Republic) – 1 September 5 2015. In this report, the IIT concluded, on the basis of all information obtained and its analysis, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, on 1 September 2015, during sustained attacks aimed at capturing the town of Marea, units of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) deployed sulfur mustard, using one or more artillery guns. The IIT was able to identify a number of four named individuals as perpetrators, and two further ISIL members were identified as the primary drivers of ISIL’s chemical weapons programme. The Secretary-General has shared the IIT report with Council Members as document S/2024/200. The IIT will continue its investigations and will issue further reports in due course.
Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Security Council, As the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs has emphasized on many occasions, any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. I also echo the Secretary-General’s call to end impunity for all those who dare to use such weapons, especially against civilians. The absence of accountability for the use of chemical weapons continues to be a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all. In closing, I urge the members of this Council to unite on this issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated.
The United Nations will continue to support all efforts to uphold the norm against chemical weapons, and to relegate these dreadful weapons to history.
The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.
I thank you very much for your attention.